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A HOT PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR  
The end of the Cold War allowed mankind to
progress in a normal way, without fear of perishing in
the flame of a nuclear conflict caused by ideological
confrontation. However, the removal of the global threat
and, along with it, of the total control of information,
movement of people, capital, technologies and arms
inherent in inter-bloc confrontation led to other
threats — ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism, ille-
gal migration, international crime, arms and drug traf-
ficking, environmental (natural and manmade) acci-
dents — coming to the forefront.
Among the above-mentioned threats, the greatest
danger fraught with possible evolution into military
conflict is posed by ethnic and religious conflicts.
Usually, they have a very long history, are quickly
aggravated and slowly resolved. Europe has many
such conflicts, at different stages and in different
forms, including near Ukraine’s borders: in the
Caucasus (Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorny Karabakh,
Ossetia), Moldova (Transdnistria), Cyprus, the
Balkans (Albania, FRY, Macedonia and other coun-
tries), Turkey. The Balkan and Caucasian conflicts
have been Europe’s primary headache over the recent
decade.
It is noteworthy that inter-ethnic and religious
contradictions appear stronger than people’s adher-
ence to the values of a democratic system and respect
for universal human rights and freedoms. To cite just
a few examples, one could mention the multiyear
confrontation between Catholics and Protestants in
Northern Ireland, separatist movements of Basques
in Spain or Corsicans in France. This arouses partic-
ular concern, since even established democracies
have failed so far to find effective remedies of such
conflicts. Some European countries (Austria, France,
Germany, Romania, Russia) are witnessing a
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For more than half a century, NATO, as a military-political alliance, has been at the core of West
European defence; today, it in fact remains the only workable defence structure in Europe. At the same
time, given the existing differences in the interests of the allies1, limitations caused by the mainly mil-
itary character of the NATO activity, and the will of the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for
their own security, there has emerged an objective necessity for developing an effective European
security and defence structure. 
Such a structure is being actively constructed under the auspices of the EU within the framework
of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). At present, this process resembles
establishment of a European branch of NATO rather than a proper response to the contemporary chal-
lenges facing Europe's security. However, it may already be stated that united Europe has real
chances of becoming a weightier actor not only in the economic but also in the security domain. 
For Ukraine, the development of CESDP offers the possibility of strengthening the distinctive
partnership with NATO in parallel with developing security and defence relations with the European
Union, accession to which has been proclaimed the strategic goal of our state.
1
The reluctance of the USA to get immediately involved in the solution of all problems of European security beyond the framework of allied commitments.
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strengthening of extreme right groupings that act
under nationalist slogans and demand expulsion of
foreigners. Open clashes between indigenous popula-
tion and representatives of different cultural commu-
nities, strengthening of radical nationalist groupings
prove that the developed European countries increas-
ingly often appear unable to ensure lasting inter-ethnic
and inter-confessional peace using customary (legal,
social and cultural) instruments of state policy. There
arises the task of searching for other, adequate means
of prevention and containment of potential conflicts
on ethno-cultural grounds.
International terrorism poses a real threat to
European security. Despite the decrease in the total
number of terrorist acts committed all over the world2,
the events in the USA on September 11, 2001, prove
that the threat of terrorism is not decreasing, but
increasing. Huge human losses, impressive material
damage and the psychological shock experienced by not
only Americans, but people in the majority of countries
of the world3, show that counteraction to terrorist
organisations should be viewed as the primary assign-
ment of security structures, including Europeans. The
leaders of the majority of West European countries have
displayed a comprehension of the importance of this
task4.
As a rule, terrorists deliver asymmetrical strikes,
when strategic goals are attained by tactical means, with-
out the employment of sophisticated weapons. At the
same time, the technical capabilities of terrorists are
expanding: they employ commonly accessible new infor-
mation technologies, satellite communications, and
modern methods of forgery. The recipes for making
explosive devices may be found in the Internet. On the
other hand, the use of new information technologies in
systems of state management and community support
(power engineering, transport, banking sector) makes
these especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Today,
there are no effective defences against such threats. This
was proved by the consistent attempts at penetration of
hackers into the Pentagon databases, British satellite
control systems, etc. So, international computer terror-
ism is viewed as one of the main threats to security, par-
ticularly of European countries5.
Recently, there have been terrorist acts aimed not at
attainment of concrete political demands (or assassina-
tion of specific persons) but at the general political and
economic destabilisation of a country (region). This
kind of terrorism was experienced by Russia, when in
September, 1999, a series of explosions in residential
blocks has been organised. Similar tactics (along with
other terrorist acts) have been employed by fighters of
the Irish Republican Army. The recent events in the
USA have confirmed this trend. Such kind of terrorism
has the following traits: a readiness to die in a symbol-
ic act of revenge, arouse shock and fear in as many as
possible people, cause huge material losses and there-
fore disorganise the activity of the authorities and pro-
voke a political and economic crisis in the country
(region). 
The threat of terrorism should be viewed with account
of the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by ter-
rorists. While in the early 1990s, the primary threat was
believed to lie in the use of nuclear devices by terrorist
groups, at the present time, primary attention is paid to
chemical and biological weapons. The use of nuclear
technologies requires technical qualification, a solid
financial base and is hardly affordable for terrorist
organisations, if they are not supported by a state.
Chemical and biological weapons (weapons of mass
destruction for the ‘poor’) are much more accessible,
and their production, storage and transportation are
much harder to control than of nuclear weapons. Even
the USA is unable to cope with the consequences of
employment of bacteriological weapons, which was
demonstrated more than once during simulation exer-
cises held in the recent years. 
Transborder crime and terrorist organisations are
merging, using one another for attaining their goals.
Radical groups obtain funds from trafficking of drugs
and arms. Criminal organisations rather often hire
terrorist gunmen for the removal of politicians and for
subversive acts. For instance, there were reports about
contacts between the Basque nationalist terrorist organ-
isation ÅÒÀ and Colombian drug cartels in the form
of mutual assistance in arranging explosions in
exchange for financial assistance to terrorists from drug
cartels6. 
2
While in the late 1980s, more than 800 terrorist acts were committed annually (1987 — 832, 1989 — 856), in the late 1990s, there were no more than
400 such cases a year. See the article by UCEPS expert: I.Zhdanov. Terror means fear. — Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, August 14, 2001, p.5, http://www.zerkalo-
nedeli.com.ua; http://www.uceps.com.ua. 
3
For more detail on the lessons and consequences of those terrorist acts, see the article by UCEPS President À.Grytsenko “Starting Point” published in this
journal.
4
For instance, European allies of the USA decided to render their support to reprisals for the New-York and Washington terrorist attacks committed on
September 11, 2001. See: Interfax-Europe, September 13, 2001.
5
According to assessments made public at the 10th Crime Prevention Congress (April, 2000, Vienna), the overall income of terrorists from computer crimes
makes $500 million a year. Losses from computer terrorists amount to $3.5 billion a year and increase by 35% annually; average losses inflicted by a single
computer terrorist attack make up $560 thousand. See: Introduction to information security. — http://www.warning.dp.ua/comp4.
6
Dubina À. Terrorist international. — Stolichnye Novosti, September 3, 2001, p.9.
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The struggle against illegal arms and drug trafficking
is becoming increasingly topical for Europe, since, apart
from direct negative consequences, a large share of
profit from those criminal transactions is channelled to
finance participants of armed conflicts and terrorists. In
particular, there were reports that Kosovars bought arms
and trained their fighters for funds obtained from drug
trafficking. Hence, opposition to this threat presents one
of the main tasks of the recently established Europol,
along with struggle against international terrorism,
human slavery, ‘laundering of money’ and transnation-
al crime.
The threats mentioned above
extremely rarely emanate from
states whose leadership may be
pressed into negotiations and
agreements; the international
scene is increasingly seeing the
actions of non-governmental (out
of governmental control) actors
whose activity covers the territory
of several countries or entire
regions. The carriers of the new
threats very rarely wear uniforms
and do not observe norms of the
international law that regiment
combat operations, treatment of
combatants and civilian popula-
tion. The overwhelming majority
of them is integrated into the
common public, may freely travel
around the world and enjoy all
benefits of civilisation using
them for attaining their goals.
Furthermore, terrorist activity
acquires a global character. For
instance, the network of terrorist
organisations operated by interna-
tional terrorist Osama bin Laden,
who is the main suspect of the
terrorist acts committed in the
USA, may encompass as many as
34 countries, including Great
Britain. This was stated in a report
prepared by the US Congress far before the tragedy of
the 11th of September, 2001. It is not ruled out that this
network has access to air defence assets and chemical
weapons7. 
The terrorist attacks on the USA showed that
transborder terrorist (or other criminal) groupings
may inflict no less damage than a sudden attack of
armed forces of a sovereign state or an organised
separatist movement. Transborder groupings are for-
mally not controlled by any government, so, the
effectiveness of classical means of international
diplomacy, economic pressure, traditional military
operations against them (by NATO forces or the
WEU Eurocorps8) is limited.
Of late, Europe has witnessed the accumulation of
a new potential for conflict created by strong flows of
migration, particularly from the Arab East, North
Africa, Central Asia. Refugees from regions of armed
conflict and labour migrants are coming in.
Stratification of countries by the standard of life crite-
rion increases the number of those willing to flee from
poverty to rich West European states, especially on the
background of the labour market decline in some EU
countries. The inflow of illegal migrants is increasing,
and a significant number of those emerge in the ‘shad-
ow’ sector: experts put the number of illegal workers
in the EU countries at approximately 20 million9.
According to Europol, organised
illegal immigration presents an
increasing problem for the EU.
Every year, hundreds of thou-
sands of immigrants illegally
come to Europe10. There are
estimates that their number
(including those who later man-
aged to get naturalised) amounts
to 10% of West Europe’s popu-
lation. Under the EU PHARE
Programme, Austria, Germany
and other countries grant
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
significant funds for strengthen-
ing of their eastern borders.
Poland is implementing a pro-
gramme of border infrastructure
development on the border with
Russia, Lithuania, Belarus and
Ukraine11.
Europe is also witnessing a
deterioration of the natural and
manmade environment, which
may lead to significant human
and material losses. Over the
recent years, nature more than
once showed its ruinous
strength — hurricanes called ‘the
storm of the century’ in France;
forest fires in France and
Slovakia; the ‘Lothar’ hurricane in Germany; winds up
to 250 km/h in Switzerland; 430Ñ heat in Greece;
blocking of railways by many days of rain in Scotland
and England in 2000; floods of 2001 in Poland and
France, etc. The 1997 flood on the river Oder flooded
Poland and Germany alike (55 people died, losses
exceeded $1 billion). All this points to the trans-border
nature of threats that require joint efforts on the inter-
national level for joint prevention and containment of
consequences of emergencies.
This threat is topical for Ukraine, too: rains
accompanied with hurricanes on the territory of seven
regions in July-August, 2000, icing in November-
December, 2000, in 12 regions, a disastrous flood in
7
Interfax-America, September 14, 2001.
8
The WEU Eurocorps was established in 1992. It is composed of army divisions and brigades from Belgium, Spain, Germany and France and a reconnais-
sance company from Luxembourg. The corps’ strength may make up 60,000. Its multinational headquarters is located in Strasbourg, France.
9
Ivanitsky À. Immigrants ‘in law’. — Vedomosti (Russia), July 16, 2001, p.5. 
10
Europol Annual Report 2000. http://www.europol.eu.int/content.htm?reports/ar00/en.htm.
11
Ralemska I. Interpol counters migrants. — Uryadovyi Kuryer, January 18, 2001, p.10.
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Transcarpathia in March, 2001, and a tornado in
January of the same year. According to official data,
over three years, material losses inflicted by natural
accidents alone have increased in Ukraine more than
ten-fold: from $28 million in 1997 to $294 million in
200012. It is no wonder that Ukraine put forward the
initiative of establishment of a joint military unit
(involving Ukraine, Romania and Hungary, later
joined by Slovakia) — “Tysa” engineer battalion
designated for prompt solution of tasks emerging in
regions hit by a natural disaster in any of the member
countries13.
These and other threats are usually of a composite
character, and are therefore accompanied with signifi-
cant human losses and economic damage. So, their con-
tainment requires composite co-ordinated efforts of
many countries.
Therefore, ten years after the end of the Cold War,
the European situation is characterised by aggravation of
transnational threats. Traditional military means are
becoming less and less suitable for countering those
threats. Diplomatic, political, economic, informational,
law enforcement measures, along with military assets
used in their new quality — compact, mobile, highly
effective, trained to cope with a range of tasks at all
stages of a conflict, are becoming far more important.
Correspondingly, much more attention should be paid to
co-ordination of security efforts on the international
level: the role of the existing structures of European
security, including NATO and the EU, is not decreasing
but changing considerably, in line with the nature of
present and future threats and their possible conse-
quences.
ADAPTATION OF NATO 
AND THE EU TO NEW CONDITIONS: 
THE BEGINNING OF A LONG ROAD
After the end of the Cold War, it became clear that
the fundamentally different military-political situation
in Europe required a revision of the foundations and
principles of activity of NATO, the EU and other
European structures and their adaptation to new condi-
tions. 
Changes in NATO’s European policy
Immediately after 1991, the Alliance began trans-
forming its concepts and structures14. Collective defence
of the member countries remained the main task of
NATO, but it was supplemented with the task of
strengthening security all over the European continent.
The increased attention of the Alliance to the European
scene was strengthened by the USA desire to raise the
Europeans’ responsibility (first of all, financial) for their
own security.
NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept announced its
intention to develop a European Security and Defence
Identity15, which presumed: promotion of the WEU role
as a defence component of the EU; granting WEU
access to NATO assets within the framework of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); imple-
mentation of a new concept of Combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF) presenting unified NATO structures that
could be used for operational planning and the conduct
of WEU and NATO operations. 
The CJTF concept is based on the establishment of
a flexible system of NATO headquarters to be provided
with combat-ready “supporting” modules depending on
the concrete situation. Such staffs are formed to man-
age military units of different composition, from differ-
ent countries (including non-NATO) led by WEU
(from 1999 — also by the EU). CJTF should be “sep-
arable but not separate” from NATO, i.e., they will rely
on NATO infrastructure but will formally perform oper-
ations under the auspices of the EU, not NATO. For
several years, the CJTF has been tested at field training
exercises involving NATO and the EU members and
partner countries; concept’s introduction should be
completed before 2004.
Changes in the EU security environment
Changes in the international situation in the early
1990s had an impact not only on NATO but also on
the EU. A significant reduction of the US presence in
Europe, NATO transformation, strengthening of the
economic posture of the EU — all this made members
of this primarily economic union form a Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Formation of the CFSP was envisaged by the
Treaty of European Union (Maastricht, 1992) that
stressed the need for addressing “all questions relating
to the security of the Union, including the progressive
framing of a common defence policy, which might lead
to a common defence”. Article J.4.2 of the Treaty
allowed the EU to task the WEU “to prepare and exe-
cute the decisions and actions of the Union relating to
the defence sector”. At their meeting in Petersberg
near Bonn (June, 1992), the WEU foreign and defence
ministers outlined the range of CFSP tasks (the so-
called “Petersberg Tasks”) — humanitarian and rescue
tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in cri-
sis management, including peacemaking — and co-
ordinated the issues of detachment of assets and capa-
bilities at EU disposal. 
In fact, up until 1999, CFSP had existed on paper
only, but the recent three years have seen the rapid devel-
opment of a CFSP element — the Common European
Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) that envisages the
establishment of effective structures under the EU aus-
pices, using the WEU’s potential in particular. 
Such a development was made possible by: the will
and readiness of the EU countries to back the
12
Kosovets Î. Are only the whims of weather to blame? — Uryadovyi Kuryer, August 14, 2001, p.7.
13
This initiative was suggested by Ukraine in 1998. It is provided, that Ukraine and Romania will form two companies for the battalion, Slovakia and Hungary —
one company each. The Ukrainian part of the battalion (159 men and more than 60 pieces of engineering equipment) has already been organised.
14
After 1991, NATO nuclear arsenal in Europe was reduced by 90%, conventional forces — by 30-40%. The Alliance command structure reform continues: in
1999, there were 65 command headquarters, in 2003, only 20 are set to remain.
15
The Concept of the European Security and Defence Identity was adopted in 1994.
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advanced economic component of the Union with
adequate measures in the security sector and decrease
the excessive dependence of Europe on the USA for
the resolution of European problems; changes in the
nature and priorities of threats to the regional securi-
ty after the end of the Cold War that required new
counteractions not inherent in NATO (military-
political alliance created for collective defence of its
members).
Formation of CESDP was fixed in Article 17 of the
new version of the Treaty of European Union
(Amsterdam, 1997). Such a decision by the EU coun-
tries was probably prompted, among other things, by a
dramatic experience of conflict management in Bosnia
and Herzegovina by European countries under UN aus-
pices in 1992-1995 — Europeans displayed their inabil-
ity to contain a conflict in the centre of Europe without
the US assistance. The EU has already spent Euro 20
billion to mitigate the consequences of the Balkan
conflict (200,000 deaths, 1.8 million refugees), which
European countries failed to prevent. 
In November, 2000, the WEU Council of Ministers
in Marseilles, France, agreed to rather radical measures:
to assign the existing structures to EU disposal before
July, 2001, and formally leave the functions of collec-
tive defence, parliamentary supervision of the security
domain and promotion of co-operation in the arms pro-
duction sector with the WEU. 
In pursuance of the decisions taken on CESDP, a
number of executive bodies of the EU has been estab-
lished: the Office of the High Representative for the
CFSP (supported by a planning cell of 40 persons), the
EU Political and Security Committee, Military
Committee and Military Staff (130-150 persons). Before
the end of 2001, those structures should enable the
European Union to conduct humanitarian, rescue and
peacekeeping operations. 
The immediate plans for the future envisage the
establishment of the EU rapid reaction force (corps)
before 2003. The Table “Details of the EU rapid reaction
corps” gives some impression of the future shape of this
military structure of the EU. 
Therefore, in the 1990s, the EU countries gradually
became firmly convinced that an economic union of such
geographic reach, with a population of over 400 million
people and GDP of nearly $8.5 trillion, cannot further
develop without an effective security and defence capa-
bility. It seems that this time, after previous unsuccess-
ful attempts by the EU to develop military structures,
political declarations have better chances of coming
true.
Evolution of the NATO-EU relations: problem areas
Presently, we are witnessing the development of
NATO-EU relations with the purpose of avoiding
duplication of functions and structures, establishment
of mutually complementary capabilities of armed con-
flict prevention on the European continent. This
process is not trouble-free. It is characterised by the
declared coherence of NATO and the EU, confine-
ment of the CESDP to primarily peacekeeping opera-
tions and at the same time — the vast vagueness of the
powers and tasks of the EU in the sphere of security
and defence.
The analysis of the practical steps taken by the EU,
including for the creation of the rapid reaction force,
allows to state that the European Union plans to per-
form essentially the same military tasks as transformed
NATO, with the exception of collective defence. The
most topical problem areas in relations between the
USA and its European allies, NATO and the EU, are
the following: the parity of resource contribution to
the strengthening of the European security; imbalance
of military capabilities; division of the areas of res-
ponsibility (both geographically and functionally); 
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co-ordination of positions of the two organisations’
member countries (for strategic and operational deci-
sion-making); consideration of interests of the mem-
ber countries, etc. 
The NATO leadership believes that the Common
European Security and Defence Policy of the EU
should be inalienably connected and compatible (inte-
grated) with the NATO’s European Security and
Defence Identity. At the same time, the development
of the European Security and Defence Identity and
CJTF are taking place on the background of accusa-
tions by allies of the inadequacy of European countries’
defence expenditures and the combat strength of their
armed forces when compared with present day require-
ments, in other words, of an unjust division of respon-
sibility between the USA and Europe for European
security. 
As Table “Strength of armed forces and defence
expenditures of the USA and their European NATO allies”
shows, by the numerical strength, the European compo-
nent of NATO exceeds the USA figure more than two-
fold, but military expenditures of the Europeans make
up a meagre 64% of the USA.
According to different assessments, the aggregate
combat potential of the European NATO members
makes up 10-30% of the USA potential, since
Europeans spend far less than the United States on
research and development and procurement of
weapons. Additionally, the USA applies much higher
requirements to combat readiness, compared to
European armed forces. For instance, average annual
flying practice of combat pilots in the European NATO
countries in late 1990s was 160 hours (NATO require-
ment — 180 hours), while in the USA — the figure was
220 hours16.
The imbalance between the capabilities of the USA
and European allies was most vividly demonstrated by the
NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999. It involved 13
members of the Alliance, but 85% of night and bad
weather sorties were flown, and 80% of precision-guid-
ed ammunition and 95% of cruise missile strikes were
delivered by the US forces. All in all, that NATO mili-
tary campaign brought European leaders a very unpleas-
ant discovery: it proved that European countries lag
behind17 the USA in such fields as projection of forces,
use of sophisticated defence technologies, computer and
intelligence systems. 
The desire of the Europeans to close the “gap” in mil-
itary capabilities between them and the USA is not yet
backed by resources18. Immediately after Kosovo, the
total defence expenditures of the European NATO
members increased (by $8 billion in 1999), but later this
growth stopped, and a decline began. According to cal-
culations made by French experts, implementation of
CESDP will require an increase of annual expenditures
of the EU countries on modernisation and procurement
of new weapons almost two-fold — from the present
$30-35 billion to $60 billion19. Given the halt of growth
of defence budgets in the EU countries (and even their
decrease in 2000), the prospects for CESDP do not look
very optimistic.
From the very beginning of CESDP development,
the US officials20 expressed reservations that CESDP
should in no way weaken NATO, for instance, by set-
ting tasks for the European rapid reaction corps that
would make it a competitor to NATO structures. The
USA continues to emphasise the need for inalienable
unity and full co-ordination of action between NATO
and the EU. At the end of 2000, the USA expressed
concern by the fact that, in its opinion, “the path to a
successful strengthening of the European pillar of
transatlantic security may appear, on occasion, exces-
sively long and needlessly contentious”21. Americans
said that “NATO and the EU must work co-operative-
ly to develop (and avoid unnecessary duplication of)
the military assets and capabil-
ities required by both organisa-
tions”22.
European NATO members
largely share US concerns.
France, for instance, encour-
ages its European partners to
clearly define the minimum
share of GDP to be spent on
procurement of new weapons.
According to the French
16
Kugler R. and Vanderbeek T. Where Is NATO Defence Posture Headed? — Strategic forum paper No.133, 1998, Institute for National Strategic Studies, USA;
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum133.html.
17
Falkenrath R. European Security and NATO. — National Security & Defence, 2000, No.7, p.33. During the Kosovo operation, there were cases when some
NATO countries disagreed with decisions taken by NATO under the US pressure. So, one of the declared targets of CESDP was to enable the EU countries to
conduct crisis management operations where "the USA or NATO as a whole for some reason decide not to be engaged".
18
This was stressed in an article by P.Volten "The EU as an Actor in Security Policy: Rival or Partner of the USA?", published in this journal.
19
Ryter M.-A. EU Capabilities for Autonomous Military Crisis Management: Possibilities and Limits. — National Defence College, Department of Strategic and
Defence Studies, Helsinki, 2001, p.34.
20
Then Secretary of State Ì.Albright, Secretary of Defence W.Cohen, the US Ambassador to NATO À.Vershbow and others.
21
See: "Strengthening Transatlantic Security: a U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century". — Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence (International Security
Affairs), December, 2000, p.20. 
22
Note 21, p.21.
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Defence Minister À.Richard, “the minimum should be
0.05% of GDP and we would do better to aim for 0.06%
or 0.07%” says Richard (the current figure for France is
0.06%). “Unfortunately, many in Europe have fallen
well bellow even the bare minimum we are recom-
mending”23.
So far, Europeans are unable to channel enough funds
even into the identified key sectors — transportation and
space intelligence. The intention of Great Britain, Italy,
Germany and France to develop satellite intelligence
systems might be hailed as an example of fruitful co-
operation of the EU countries in the framework of
CESDP, had the funds allocated thereto been not that
meagre: the USA invests 10 times more than all EU
countries for this purpose24. Being reluctant (unable) to
give up their social programmes for the benefit of
defence expenditures, European countries are trying to
raise combat effectiveness of their armed forces in two
ways: through more effective use of available funds and
armed forces reform (on a professional basis). 
When identifying the EU resource requirements, one
should take into account the actual conditions for achiev-
ing military objectives. The declared goal of a 60,000-
strong rapid reaction corps means that the EU coun-
tries should have a combat-ready contingent of three
times that size, i.e., 180,000, since full deployment of a
60,000-strong force requires the same number of troops
on training for the tasks and rotation, and in the event
of a durable operation, another third will be restoring
combat effectiveness and recreating after the assign-
ment.
The uncertainty of the EU as to the Union’s secu-
rity strategy and area of responsibility within the
framework of CESDP remain problem issues25. This
particularly manifests itself in the geographic coverage
of AOR of the EU CESDP. What should that area be
like? The same as defined for NATO, presuming pos-
sible use of force beyond the borders of the member
countries, or different? Will that area cover all regions
(countries) where the EU has interests (without any
limitations), or will it have a radius of 4000 km
around Brussels, as stated by some European leaders?
There are no clear answers to those questions.
Moreover, “constructive ambiguity” has taken root in
the EU and NATO diplomatic lexicon, and this term
is designed to cover the existing contradictions of the
parties and their unpreparedness to agree their posi-
tions within the EU and NATO framework, let alone
the positions of other European states outside the two
organisations. 
In this context, the particular position of Turkey on
the EU access to the NATO infrastructure strikes the
eye. Turkey as a NATO member may bar the use of the
Alliance’s infrastructure in EU-led operations if it is not
guaranteed a say in relevant political decision making,
as well as in planning and conduct of EU operations in
the regions of interest to Turkey. Co-ordination of con-
trary positions seems uneasy, since Turkey is not an EU
member; furthermore, the situation may be further com-
plicated after Cyprus’ accession to the EU. It is not dif-
ficult to predict that in several years, after the EU and
NATO expansion, contrary positions of the member
countries will be still more difficult to agree, since poli-
tical decisions on the use of military forces are to be
taken by consensus. When taking such decisions, the
political leadership of many countries may meet with a
lack of understanding and opposition of its own popu-
lation — due to the reluctance to look for answers to
difficult questions now26.
The last two years have seen a number of measures
aimed at strengthening co-ordination between NATO
and the EU. In January, 2001, when neutral Sweden
took the EU presidency, the EU and NATO signed an
agreement on fundamentals of permanent consultations
and co-operation aimed at co-ordination of problem
issues emerging in course of NATO and EU transfor-
mation, to provide better understanding of the future
CESDP. According to Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Sweden for policy issues S.-U. Petersson,
“ESDP is not a military alliance, nor is it a European
army. There are no mutual or collective defence guar-
antees, no special standing forces and no common
command system. The ESDP is limited to crisis man-
agement and conflict prevention; it is not about terri-
torial self-defence”27. Assessing the practical steps, one
23
See: Lewis J. and Mathonniere J. France Faces a New Era: Fewer but Faster. — Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol.33, No.17, April 26, 2000, p.40. 
24
The New Security Dimensions — Europe after the NATO and EU Enlargements. — Report of the Frosunda Conference, Sweden, SIPRI, April 20-21, 2001, p.25.
25
It is worth notice that some ambiguity is also intrinsic in the NATO 1999 Strategic Concept (on obtaining a UN mandate for operations outside the Alliance's
geographic area, possibility of the first use of nuclear arms, their stationing on the territories of the new members, etc.).
26
These problems are analysed in an article by UCEPS expert Ì.Pashkov "Problems of European Security: Positions of the Population of Ukraine" published in this
journal.
27
The New Security Dimensions...,  p.25.
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can point out some attempts of CESDP to identify its
place with respect to NATO. For instance, in
November, 1999, representatives of the WEU
Eurocorps offered its headquarters to exercise control
of the KFOR operation on its basis. In January
2000, this offer was accepted, and the KFOR head-
quarters is primarily made up by the Eurocorps offi-
cers. 
Experts believe28 that traditional military assets are
becoming increasingly less suitable for countering the
present threats, especially at the preventive stage.
Today, much more important are political, diplomatic,
economic, informational and law enforcement instru-
ments, along with military assets of a new type — com-
pact, mobile, highly effective. The situation requires new
solutions that NATO will not readily offer, because of
its specificity as a collective defence organisation. This
gap is probably to be filled by Europeans with their
CESDP. 
The rapid reaction force being formed by the EU
may counter threats at the phase of direct collision of
the conflicting parties, conflict escalation, and only to a
limited extent deal with other phases — growing of ten-
sion between the conflicting parties, division of the con-
flicting parties after the conflict is over; at the same
time, the phases of conflict origination, growth into cri-
sis, restoration of peace and post-conflict settlement so
far remain beyond the CESDP focus.
The EU intention to complement the military com-
ponent of CESDP with a civilian (law enforcement) one
deserves attention: in addition to the formation of the
rapid reaction corps, the EU countries must be ready to
assign 5000 police officers for crisis management opera-
tions, of whom, 1000 should be ready to perform their
duties within 30 days after the decision on their deploy-
ment29. 
Another noticeable development was the EU deci-
sion of May 22, 2000, to set up a new structure — the
Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management.
This Committee will evidently supplement CESDP.
Additionally, immediately after the terrorist attack in the
USA, the EU countries urgently decided to “make every
effort to strengthen our intelligence efforts against ter-
rorism”30. Sadly, the awareness of the importance of
those measures came late.
There are also external factors that may complicate
the relations between NATO and the EU in the security
domain. First of all, this refers to Russia’s position, its
readiness (unreadiness) to practical co-operation with
those organisations. Russia strongly opposes NATO
expansion and consistently insists on the forced charac-
ter of its co-operation with the Alliance. At the same
time, it seems more friendly towards the EU and sees
no danger in its expansion. Russia also expressed a
desire to take an active part in CESDP; at that, it
opposes the USA domination in the unipolar world,
and particularly views the united Europe as a counter-
balance to the USA, including in the security and
defence domain. Experts believe that after the terrorist
attack on the USA on September 11, 2001, one may
expect changes in the relations between Russia and the
USA.
All in all, it can be stated that neither NATO nor the
EU (jointly or separately) can offer an adequate response
to the new challenges. The ambiguity of the “Petersberg
tasks” of the EU does not allow detailed planning and
distribution of assets. This increases the probability of a
new crisis in the European security domain.
It is logical to assume that with time, security
responsibilities will be divided between NATO and the
EU into basically military (NATO) and basically “non-
military” (the EU). NATO may organise collective
defence and conduct large-scale military operations,
while the EU may concentrate on conflict prevention
and post-conflict rehabilitation measures, maintaining at
the same time limited peacekeeping capabilities. The EU
has sufficient financial, technical and other resources
and the experience for successful performance of such
tasks.
Should the EU appear unable to back its political dec-
larations with adequate resources, the situation similar to
observed in 1992-1995 in Yugoslavia may repeat itself:
Europeans take a decision to conduct a joint military
operation on their own but then it appears that they lack
military assets and political will for its performance, and
again have to turn to the USA and NATO as a whole for
assistance.
28
See, e.g., an article by R.Dwan "Common European Security and Defence Policy: Crisis Prevention and Management" published in this journal.
29
It goes only about the involvement of law enforcement bodies in conflict settlement (peacekeeping operations), not about co-ordination and interaction under
the CESDP auspices with the purpose of conflict prevention or containment.
30
See: "We Will Make Every Effort to Strengthen Our Intelligence Efforts against Terrorism". — Joint Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the
European Union, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, Brussels, September 14, 2001.
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for deepening interaction with the Alliance member
countries and approaching the EU. Framing of the
CESDP gives Ukraine one more chance to use partner
relations with NATO for joining the development of the
new system of European security.
Ukraine has one of the vastest programmes of co-
operation with NATO among all 27 partner countries
(Diagram “Dynamics of military co-operation between
Ukraine and NATO”) and is the only participant of the
Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), apart from
Russia, with which NATO maintains  relations of dis-
tinctive partnership.
31
Zlenko À. Speech at the NATO-Ukraine symposium “The world in the 21st century: co-operation, partnership, dialogue”. — Nauka i Oborona, 2001, No.3, p.5.
UKRAINE IN SEARCH OF ITS PLACE 
IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM  
The relations between NATO and the EU in the
security domain are entering a decisive phase. Despite
the above problems of CESDP framing, the recent three
years have shown that this structure has become estab-
lished, although it is not quite clear yet in what form —
as a European duplicate of NATO, its natural supple-
ment, or otherwise. 
At the same time, at present, there is only one
workable military-political structure in the European
security system — NATO, and it is primarily based on
permanent readiness of the US to lavishly invest in
the defence sector and maintain close ties with
Europe. There is also the EU, with its dependence on
the US in the security sphere, claims to greater inde-
pendence in that domain and questionable readiness
to back declarations of intentions with substantial
resources. 
Anyway, regardless the present uncertainty and con-
tradictions in the NATO-EU relations, Ukraine should
more actively develop ties with both institutions. This is
its right and obligation of an integral part of Europe, the
more so as Europe’s security means security for Ukraine. 
Ukraine is ready for active co-operation with both
NATO and the EU: it maintains rather fruitful relations
of distinctive partnership with the Alliance and tries to
develop strategic partner relations with the EU. As
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister A.Zlenko put it, “Doctri-
nally, Ukraine shares the concept of the new Europe
based on the European Union, the Council of Europe
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Exactly
those institutions present the basic pillars of Ukraine’s
European course”31. Despite some reservations relating
to the transitional character of the socio-economic situ-
ation in the country and the need to take into account
Russia’s position, Ukraine is trying to be a reliable part-
ner and extends its assistance for resolution of European
problems. 
What place can Ukraine occupy in the future
European security architecture? On whom does this
depend — on itself, on the European countries or on
the US and NATO, that over the recent decade have
been granting the greatest support for building an inde-
pendent democratic Ukraine? There is no ultimate
answer, as this place is almost equally determined by
all named actors.
Ukraine-NATO
The relations established between Ukraine and
NATO are quite constructive and based on mutual
understanding and readiness for the establishment and
maintenance of peace in problem regions of the world.
NATO views Ukraine as an integral part of Europe that
intends to approach the Western standards (in particu-
lar, in building its national security system) and make a
weighty contribution to stability and security in the
European region and throughout the world. For
Ukraine, special relations with NATO are a precondition
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Apart from joint co-operation on purely defensive
issues, NATO substantially helps Ukraine in the devel-
opment of the legislative basis and implementation of
democratic civilian control of the military sector, assists
with adaptation of retired servicemen, supports the
activity of non-governmental research organisations and
Ukrainian scholars, grants informational and technical
assistance, etc. Co-operation with NATO in the field of
removal of aftermath of natural and technological acci-
dents also looks promising.
With NATO support (and dependent on available
capabilities), Ukraine already takes part in strengthening
stability and security in the European region and
throughout the world. In addition to active military con-
tacts within the PfP framework, Ukraine co-operates
with NATO in the Kosovo and Macedonian peacekeep-
ing operations.
NATO has recently reiterated the Alliance’s interest
in Ukraine: “Its size and pivotal geostrategic role make
Ukraine a key to ensuring Europe's long-term stability.
That is why NATO has consistently sought to assist
Ukraine, as it charts its way into the future”32. 
A new development in Ukraine-NATO relations
was evidenced by G.Robertson’s statement that “coop-
erative ventures of Ukraine and NATO are intended to
complement Ukraine's wider process of reform. They
are a clear expression of the Alliance's determination
not to leave Ukraine alone as it charts its course into
the future”33. 
Ukraine, on its part, is ready for deepening relations
with NATO and extending its participation in the events
aimed at strengthening stability in Europe and through-
out the world. “Ukraine is ready, — A.Zlenko said, —
to deepen partnership with the Alliance inasmuch as this
meets our national interests, the interests of pan-
European and global security”34.  
At this difficult time for NATO, after the terrorist
attack on the US, Ukraine unconditionally supported the
Alliance. The statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commis-
sion of September 12, 2001, reads: “NATO and Ukraine
condemn in the strongest possible terms these atrocities,
and stand united in their commitment to ensure that
those responsible are brought to justice and punished. In
the spirit of its distinctive partnership with NATO,
Ukraine stands ready to contribute fully to this effort”35. 
The deepening of co-operation with NATO exerts a
significant positive impact on Ukraine’s security and
meets its national interests. The potential for co-operation
with NATO is quite significant and far exceeds the
attained level of co-operation. The Alliance remains open
for active interaction, whether Ukraine intends to join it
or not. It depends on Ukraine alone whether it will be
able to fully utilise this potential.
Ukraine-EU  
The EU is gradually coming to the forefront of the
European security. Given the interrelation between
Ukraine’s and the EU’s security, both Ukraine and the
European Union intensify their bilateral relations in this
domain. 
The issues of co-operation between Ukraine and
the European Union purely in the sphere of foreign
and security policy became a subject of discussion after
the Ukraine-EU Partnership and Co-operation
Agreement became effective36. They were adequately
addresses by the October, 1998, Ukraine-EU Summit
in Brussels. 
After the adoption of the EU Joint Strategy towards
Ukraine in 1999 and fixation of the strategic level of
Ukraine-EU partnership, the issue of institutionalisation
of relations in the field of foreign policy, security, mili-
tary and military-technical co-operation came to the
front. 
In September, 2000, Ukraine worked out and pre-
sented to the EU a Memorandum “Strengthening of
Co-operation between Ukraine and the European
Union in the Field of Foreign Policy, Security, Military
and Military-technical Co-operation”37. The document
was not made public, which makes it difficult to assess
its significance; however, what is known allows drawing
the conclusion that the EU appeared not ready to
accept the far-going Ukrainian proposals38.  Meanwhile,
at the Ukraine-EU Summit in Paris held in September,
2000, the issues of co-operation in the field of CFSP
were addressed separately. After that, political dialogue
in that sector significantly intensified39. 
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Robertson G. Speech at the NATO-Ukraine symposium “The world in the 21st century: co-operation, partnership, dialogue”. See: http://www.nato.int.
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Note 32.
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Interview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine À.Zlenko. — Latvijas Vestnesis, August 25, 2001, p.1.
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See: Statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commission. — NATO Press Release (126), 14 September 2001. 
36
The Agreement was signed and ratified in 1994 and became effective of March 1, 1998.
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Belashov V. Revolution in European Military Affairs. — Polityka i Chas, 2001, No.5, p.34.
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In particular, the Ukrainian side proposed raising the relations between Ukraine and the EU in the sphere of foreign policy and security to the level of “dis-
tinctive or associated strategic partnership”, following the example of relations with NATO, and made concrete proposals as to the mechanism of such part-
nership. See: ibid.
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From the beginning of 2001, the President of Ukraine four times met Secretary General of the European Council, the EU High Representative for the CFSP J.Solana.
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In their Joint Statement by the Results of the Yalta
Ukraine-EU Summit (September 11, 2001), the Parties
“marked further progress of our dialogue, co-operation
and consultations on security and defence issues” and
noted that “Ukraine may be invited to take part in oper-
ations conducted by the EU”40. 
However, real bilateral co-operation in the sphere of
CFSP so far significantly lags behind the declared goals.
The Programme of Ukraine’s Integration into the
European Union defines Ukraine’s joining CFSP as a
long-term priority (2004-2007); it also states that “at the
present stage, Ukraine-EU relations in the security
domain are on the stage of formation”. Section 17 of
the Programme, devoted to Ukraine’s co-operation with
the EU in the issues of foreign and security policy does
not outline the financial requirements and other
resource necessary for such co-operation, nor names the
sources of funds. The Plan of action at implementation
of the priority provisions of the Programme specifies the
activities at implementation of only one out of ten long-
term priorities that must be attained in 2001.
At the Yalta summit, the EU and Ukraine were to
sign “Ukraine-EU Action Plan on Justice and Internal
Affairs”, but its signing was again postponed, this time
— till the end of 2001. The idea of such Plan was pro-
posed by the Ukrainian side in 2000. The Plan should
envisage concrete steps of fighting illegal migration,
human slavery, terrorism, money laundering, illegal
drug trafficking, illegal arms trafficking, along with
practical steps at strengthening borders, visa policy,
reform of the Ukrainian judicial system and harmoni-
sation of the Ukrainian criminal law with that of the
EU. Signing of such document might assure the EU of
Ukraine’s readiness to resolute actions in said spheres,
i.e., become a step aimed at prevention of the country’s
isolation in the process of the EU approaching
Ukraine’s borders. 
Hence, the institutional level of Ukraine’s co-opera-
tion with the EU in the security sphere so far lags behind
the level of Ukraine’s co-operation with NATO. At the
same time, concrete practical steps are being made in
some directions.
This primarily refers to the bodies of justice and
internal affairs, since this domain acquires special sig-
nificance in the context of the EU enlargement — the
European Union is interested in strengthening security
of its eastern borders after the accession of candidates
from Central Europe. The Joint Statement by the
Results of the Yalta Ukraine-EU Summit stressed
“common desire of the EU and Ukraine to fight
organised crime, money laundering, illegal drug and
arms trafficking, and closely co-operate in the issues of
illegal immigration, refugees, smuggling and human
trafficking”. 
At present, assistance for the strengthening of bor-
ders is being granted not only to candidates for the EU
membership (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary), but also to
Ukraine. In particular, significant assistance for
strengthening of the Ukrainian-Russian border was
extended by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Germany
(DM 3 million in 2001), which allowed to improve the
protection of that border sector thanks to the shift of 60
units from the western border. It is noteworthy that the
flow of illegal migrants going via Ukraine has signifi-
cantly decreased (Diagram “Number of illegal migrants
detained at attempt of illegal crossing of Ukraine’s state
border”). 
40
Recently, Ukraine has again offered the EU its military transport aviation for CESDP purposes (in 1997, a Document on “Co-operation between Ukraine and
WEU in the field of long-distance air transportation” was signed) and its military assets, by the pattern of those earmarked for the NATO “Partnership for Peace”
Programme. In particular, it announced the intention to detach a group of officers led by a general to the EU Military Staff and a strengthened air mobile battal-
ion, a combined (transport and combat) helicopter squadron, a squadron of IL-76 aircraft from transport air command of Ukraine’s Air Force and some other
military assets to the EU rapid reaction corps, and grant the EU nearly 500 policemen.
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Within the framework of the ÒÀÑIS programme, a
separate project of technical assistance for the strength-
ening of Ukraine’s state border with the Republic of
Moldova and a decrease in the flow of illegal migrants
on that segment is being developed; the European
Commission took a decision to grant 3.9 million Euro
for that project41. The EU grants significant technical
assistance in 2001 for the creation of the Narkobiznes
inter-departmental databank in Ukraine intended to raise
the efficiency of fight against illegal drug trafficking.
All in all, the experience of Ukraine’s co-operation
with the EU proves that Ukraine has realistic prospects
for becoming a member of the united Europe. To be sure,
the speed of Ukraine’s movement towards the EU will
first and foremost depend on the strengthening of demo-
cratic fundamentals of Ukraine’s society and the develop-
ment of the market economy. Despite the existing prob-
lems in those domains, even in the present conditions, the
potential of deepening Ukraine’s co-operation with the
EU in the security domain should not be underestimated. 
First of all, exactly in the security domain Ukraine
has realistic chances of taking a decent place among
European democracies and improve its chances of join-
ing the European Union. Ukraine stands out among
other EU applicants: in the security domain, it may be
not only a consumer but a real contributor — in the
sphere of strategic transport, space, intelligence, peace-
keeping, law enforcement, elimination of aftermath of
natural and technological disasters, etc.
Second, Ukraine may move towards the EU mem-
bership both through direct co-operation immediately
with the Union and using the available possibilities for
co-operation with NATO: “The status of Ukraine as a
state that has special relations with NATO opens real
prospects for approach to the start line where it could
be seen as a potential member of the European
Union”42.
CONCLUSIONS
The intention of the West European countries to
create their own defence structure is almost 50 years
old, but up until recently, Europe has had only one
workable multilateral defence structure — NATO. 
Under the conditions of the Cold War, when West
European countries were preoccupied with the idea
of the Soviet military threat, the exceptional role of
NATO in the European security domain was justified.
Now, the situation has radically changed, and the
formulation of the Common European Security and
Defence Policy is a natural reflection of those
changes. 
The Balkan events and the existence of situa-
tions fraught with conflicts in other European coun-
tries prove that the danger of a military conflict in
Europe persists. This time, such danger originates
not from the ideological inter-bloc confrontation
41
Practice shows that the process of reform of border structures of countries - candidates for the EU membership in accordance with the EU standards
requires significant funds. For instance, the budget of one project of adaptation of the border regime management system of the Bulgarian border police to the
EU norms and standards makes 2 million Euro, and implementation of the entire programme of adaptation of the Bulgarian border service through 2005 —
over 160 million Euro.
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Horbulin V. Speech at the NATO-Ukraine symposium “The world in the 21st century: co-operation, partnership, dialogue”. — Nauka i Oborona, 2001, No.3, p.9.
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but from complex effects of threats of the “new
range”. Threats to European security are real;
moreover, there is a tendency towards their aggra-
vation.
If those threats are not timely removed, they will
constantly provoke new conflicts. Europe is not fully
aware of this thing so far; at least, the responses of
NATO and the EU to the new threats are still inade-
quate.
NATO has proved its effectiveness and will
remain the core of the European security architec-
ture for the time to come. However, if the Alliance is
not transformed in the future into a more flexible and
all-inclusive security structure, its influence on the
European security will remain confined primarily to
those situations that require settlement by military
means. 
As for the EU, until recently, that organisation
has lacked political will, strategic vision, concen-
tration and openness to co-operation with other
European countries, including Ukraine, in the
security domain. At present, the attitude of
Europeans to their responsibility for their own
security is gradually improving in some sectors
(fight against illegal arms trafficking, illegal migra-
tion, formation of executive structures dealing with
the issues of security, co-operation with NATO,
etc.). Co-operation with Ukraine in those spheres
is on the rise, too. At the same time, the question
of the EU readiness to invest in the sphere of secu-
rity in line with the scope of the set political tasks
remains open.
It seems evident that the European Union should
not create a European analogue of NATO (without the
USA and Canada but with some neutral countries).
Instead, the sphere of CESDP should encompass law
enforcement and the removal of aftermath of emer-
gencies. In other words, it is desirable that CESDP
become not the EU Peacekeeping Ministry but a kind
of committee of the EU military and law enforcement
structures.
The common European security and defence poli-
cy of the EU should be really common and really
European, not just West European, which is the case
today. The road to successful prevention and resolu-
tion of conflicts is to be found only through broad co-
operation, involving good will and capabilities of all
European countries.
Despite the present uncertainty and contradic-
tions in the NATO-EU relations, Ukraine’s interests
require active co-operation in the security domain
with both organisations, such co-operation being
not confined to the military sector only, as was in the
past. 
